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Kolmogorov’s Algorithmic Mutual Information Is
Equivalent to Bayes’ Law
Fouad B. Chedid ∗
Abstract
Given two events A and B, Bayes’ law is based on the argument that
the probability of A given B is proportional to the probability of B given
A. When probabilities are interpreted in the Bayesian sense, Bayes’ law
constitutes a learning algorithm which shows how one can learn from a
new observation to improve their belief in a theory that is consistent with
that observation. Kolmogorov’s notion of algorithmic information, which
is based on the theory of algorithms, proposes an objective measure of
the amount of information in a finite string about itself and concludes
that for any two finite strings x and y, the amount of information in
x about y is almost equal to the amount of information in y about x.
We view this conclusion of Kolmogorov as the algorithmic information
version of Bayes’ law. This can be easily demonstrated if one considers
the work of Levin on prefix Kolmogorov complexity and then expresses
the amount of Kolmogorov mutual information between two finite strings
using Solomonoff’s a priori probability.
1 Bayes’ Law
Bayes’ law, also known as Bayes’ rule or Bayes’ theorem, proposes a way to
make use of available data that may affect the likelihood of an event to better
assess the probability of occurence of that event. This law was proposed by
the Reverand Thomas Bayes, born in the early 1700s, but this work of Bayes
wasn’t made public during his lifetime, and it wasn’t until after his death in
1761 that his student Richard Price communicated Bayes’ work to John Canton
in 1763 suggesting that “a communication of it to the Royal Society cannot be
improper”[5].
In the Bayesian interpretation, where a probabilty is a measure of our degree
of belief in something which is different from the frequentist interpretation of
probability, given a phenomenon P and a proposed theory T for P , Bayes’ law
provides a tool that quantifies the validity of T as supported by our initial belief
(a subjective measure) in T and the observation of some evidence E about P .
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As an equation, Bayes’ law is stated as follows.
P (T |E) =
P (T )
P (E)
.P (E|T ) (1)
We note that the above mathematical form of Bayes’ law is due to the French
mathematician Laplace who came to a similar conclusion in 1774. Following
Laplace’s logic, equation 1 argues that the probability of a theory given an
evidence is proportional to the probability of that evidence given that theory.
In equation 1, P (T ) is the initial probability of T , which is our initial belief in T
prior to observing any evidences (aka a priori probability or the prior), P (T |E)
is the probability of T given E, which is the probability of T after accounting
for the evidence E (aka a posteriori probability or the posterior), and P (E) is
the probability of E given all possible theories for P . Thus, Bayes’ law allows
us to update our initial belief in T in a way that accounts for the evidence E.
Clearly, Bayes’ law constitutes a learning algorithm and is probably one
of the earliest demonstration of a data-driven approach to learning. We view
the difference between the a priori probability and the posteriori probability in
Bayes’ law as some manifestation of the amount of information in T about E.
Informally put, we have
P (T )−P (T |E) = A manifestation of the amount of information in T about E.
(2)
In [5], Price writes about the problem solved by Bayes’ law that “Every
judicious person will be sensible that the problem now mentioned is necessary
to be sovled in order to a sure foundation for all our reasonings concerning past
facts, and that is likely to be hereafter”. In fact, Bayes’ law is considered one of
the most fundamental applications of probability theory and has been compared
to the Pythagorean theorem in geometry [6].
2 Kolmogorov’s Algorithmic Information
Kolmogorov Complexity (aka Algorithmic Information Theory) was developed
independently by Ray Solomonoff [8], Andrey Kolmogorov [3], and Gregory
Chaitin [2] in 1964, 1965, and 1969, respectively. At the core of this theory
is the notion of a Universal Turing Machine of Alain Turing [9], which follows
from the fact that a Turing machine is capable of simulating any other Turing
machine.
2.1 Why Universality Matters?
Picture yourself walking into a bookstore. There, you would find people of all
walks of life browsing books either for fun or for learning enough about the
information content of a book so that they can decide whether the content
is worth the price. In this context, the quality of a book is not an intrinsic
property of the book itself, but rather depends on the background and taste
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of the reader, which naturally would differ from one reader to another. Now,
obtaining an objective measure of the quality of any book requires that we have
a universal reader who is a highest authority in all subjects. A book review
provided by a universal reader could then be described as an intrinsic property
of the book itself.
All three inventors (Kolmogorov, Solomonoff, and Chaitin) used the concept
of a Universal Turing Machine (UTM) to propose new ideas with built-in uni-
versal qualities. In particular, Kolmogorov’s notion of algorithmic information
relies on the existence of a universal decompressor (universal Turing machine) to
propose a new definition of information that deviates from the notion of infor-
mation being tied to a random variable (as discussed in Shannon’s information
theory) and makes information tied to an individual string, free of any prob-
ability distributions. Similarly, Solomonoff’s notion of algorithmic probability
is the halting probability of a Universal Probabilistic Turing Machine (UPTM)
that takes no inputs, or equivalently, the halting probability of a UTM that
takes an infinite random string as an input.
2.2 Kolmogorov Complexity
Kolmogorov used the theory of algorithms of Turing to redefine randomness
as incompressibility (or equivalently, lack of regularities) and to propose that
the random or incompressible content of a finite string represents the amount of
uncertainty or information in it. Given a finite string x, Kolmogorov complexity
is defined as our ability to capture the regular part of x so that when given the
random part p of x, we would be able to reconstruct x from p (decompresses p
to regenerate x). We note that we are not interested in how x got compressed
down to p, we simply want to have an effective way to uncover x from p1.
Our discussion this far suggests that the Kolmogorov complexity of a finite
binary string x is defined relative to a particular decompression algorithm (a
Turing machine) M as the length of a smallest input p that causes M , when it
reads p, to generate x and then halts. In a mathematical form, we have
CM (x) = min
input p
{|p| :M(p) = x} (3)
As such, Kolmogorov complexity is made relative to a particular algorithm or
Turing machine, which can hardly mean anything (this is similar to the point we
made in the previous section when we argued that the quality of a book cannot
be determined by the taste and background of a particular reader). Here, the
notion of a Universal Turing Machine (UTM) comes to the rescue. Knowing
that a UTM U can simulate any other Turing machine M , rewriting equation 3
relative to U gives a universal meaning to CU (x). This is true because we can
easily show that for all other Turing machines M , we have
CU (x) ≤ CM (x) + c
1Kolmogorov complexity is about decompression, and not compression.
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where c is a constant that depends onM , but not on x. In particular, c is about
the length of the binary encoding ofM . The input of U would consist of the pair
(bin(M), p) so that U would know how to simulate M on the input p; that is,
U(bin(M), p) = M(p). If we next let CM (x) = |q| for some string q; that is, q is
a shortest input for M to generate x, then CU (x) ≤ q+ |bin(M)|+c
′, where c′ is
the length of a self-delimiting binary encoding of the length of bin(M), which U
uses to separate bin(M) from q. This result is known as the Invariance Theorem
and was discovered independently by Solomonoff and Kolmogorov. Moreover,
given any other UTM U ′, since a UTM is just another Turing machine, we have
CU (x) ≤ CU ′(x) + c
CU ′(x) ≤ CU (x) + c
or equivalently,
|CU (x) − CU ′(x)| ≤ c
where c is a constant that depends on U and U ′, but not on x. Thus, it doesn’t
really matter which UTM we choose in our definition of Kolmogorov complexity
as long as we accept to tolerate an additive constant error in the result, which
can be large! A better statement is that it actually does matter which UTM
we use in the definition of Kolmogorov complexity, but once we fix a reference
UTM U , we will have a universal definition in the sense that the value of CU (x)
may exceed the true value of the amount of information in x by a constant term,
but it is never less than it.
2.3 Kolmogorov Mutual Information
First, we review the argument of Kolmogorov for calling C(x) the amount of
information in x about itself. Kolmogorov introduced the notion of the con-
ditional complexity of a string x in presence of another string y that is made
available to the UTM U for free. In particular, we have
CU (x|y) = min
input p
{|p| : U(y, p) = x}
Here, we follow Kolmogorov’s notation and place the auxilliary information y
before the input p. Next, Kolmogorov argued [3] that since C(x|y) ≤ C(x), it
is fair to call the differene C(x)−C(x|y) the amount of information in y about
x, to be denoted by
IU (y : x) = CU (x)− CU (x|y)
We note that this argument is similar to the argument we hinted to in Section
1 on Bayes’ law, when we proposed P (T ) − P (T |E) as a manifestation of the
amount of information in E about T .
We next ask what is I(x : x)? What is C(x : x)?
Clearly, C(x|x) = min
input p
{|p| : M(x, p) = x} = the constant length of the copy
program p that copies its input to its output. Thus, up to an additive constant,
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C(x|x) = 0 and I(x : x) = C(x). For this reason, Kolmogorov suggested to call
C(x) the amount of information in x about itself2.
We mention that prior to this work of Kolmogorov, the notion of the in-
formation content of a string wasn’t there (almost). For example, Shannon’s
work was about the minimum number of bits needed on the average to trans-
mit a value taken by a random variable, as a syntactic unit independent of any
semantic3. Similarly, Chaitin was interested in studying the size of a shortest
program capable of generating a given sequence of bits on a universal Turing
machine, and Solomonoff was interesed in predicting the next value taken by a
random variable following an unknown probability distribution. While this is
true in general, the following definition of a possible information measure was
first suggested by Wiener in 1948: “The amount of information provided by a
single message mi, I(mi) = − log2 pi”, which is related to the number of bits
needed to identify any of the messages which happen to occur with probability
pi. The comforting thing is that both Shannon and Kolmogorov notions of in-
formation agree that information is about removal of uncertainty. This agrees
with the point of view suggested by Kolmogorov, though seen from an opposite
end, that information is about the ability to uncover regularity. That is, the
more regular a string is, the less information it has4, and vice versa.
3 Solomonoff’s Algorithmic Probability and Its
Relationship to Kolmogorov Complexity
To understand Solomonoff’s algorithmic probability, we first need to recall the
notion of a probabilistic Turing Machine (PTM). A PTM is similar to a non-
deterministic Turing machine with an added read-only tape, called the random
tape, that is full of random bits. The machine can have two possible next
moves in any configuration, and the choice is made based on the next bit read
off the random tape (the assumption is that the two possible next moves in any
configuration are equally likely). Let q be the random sequence of bits read off
the random tape of a PTM M when it runs on input p. The halting probability
of M(p, q) is the product of the probabilities of the choices taken at each step
of the computation, which is 2−|q|. The output of M is a string x = M(p, q),
if M accepts p. We note that M may accept p in one execution and reject it
in another. We next consider the case when M runs on the empty tape. The
halting probability PM (x) of M is the sum of halting probabilities of M(λ, q)
for all random strings q which cause M(λ, q) to output x and halt. Solomonoiff
called PM (x) the algorithmic probabilty of x relative to M . We have
PM (x) =
∑
random q:M(λ,q)=x
2−|q|
2We could call it self-information, similar to the notion of self-entropy.
3In his 1948 paper, Shannon wrote “ ... semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant
to the engineering problem ..”.
4Alternatively, the less uncertainty it contains.
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Given that we requireM to halt immediately after it outputs x, then all random
q which appear in the equation of P (x) must be prefix free. By Kraft’s inequality,
we have P (x) ≤ 1.
Solomonoff’s work on algorithmic probability assumes a deterministic Turing
machine M (not a probabilistic one) whose input consists of an infinite random
binary string with equal probabilities for zero and one. Thus, we can write
PM (x) =
∑
random p:M(p)=x
2−|p|
Solomonoff next used the notion of a Universal Turing Machine (UTM) to give
his algorithmic probability a universal sense and called his algorithmic proba-
bility PU (x) relative to a UTM U a universal a priori m(x). Levin [4] showed
that m(x) is a universal lower semicomputable semimeasure in the sense that
for any other probabilistic Turing machineM , PM (x) ≤ c.m(x), for all x, where
c is a constant that depends on M , but not on x. This result shows that m(x)
dominates (is superior to) any other lower semicomputable semimeasure PM (x)
(= the halting probability distribution generated by a probabilistic Turing ma-
chine).
We recall that Solomonoff’s overall objective was to be able to predict the
next sequence of bits in a string that is generated by a random source for which
we know nothing about its governing probability disribution. His method uses
Bayes’ law where the unknown a priori probability gets replaced by his a priori
probability m(.).
We conclude this section by emphasizing the following observations:
1. Setting the halting probability of M to 2−|p| makes the argument that
the less (more) randomness the string x contains, the higher (lower) its
algorithmic probability is.
2. The algorithmic probability accounts for all possible different random con-
tents that allows the machine M to recover x. Solomonoff writes in [8]:
“The assignment of high a priori probabilities to sequences with many de-
scriptions corresponds to a feeling that if an occurrence has many possible
causes, then it is more likely.”
3. Solomonoff’s logic in his algortihmic probability agrees with the logic of
Epicurus, which states that “If more than one theory is consistent with the
data, keep them all.” which intrestingly expresses the opposite sentiment
to Occam’s razor adopted by Kolmogorov in his definition of CM (x), which
considers only a shortest random content of x that allows M to recover x.
4. Strings of high (low) algorithmic probability correspond to strings of low
(high) Kolmogorov complexity.
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4 Algorithmic Mutual Information Is Equiva-
lent to Bayes’ Law
Levin showed that Solomonoff’s algorithmic probability is related to a special
type of Kolmogorov complexity, named prefix Kolmogorov complexity (discov-
ered independently by Levin and Chaitin), which requires programs and inputs
to be prefix-free [1, 7]. It is known that for every Turing machine M , one can
construct an equivalent prefix-free Turing machine M ′ such that for all inputs
p, M(p) = M ′(p). The prefix Kolmogorov complexity of x, denoted by KU (x),
is the length of a shortest input that causes a fixed reference prefix-free UTM U
to print x and then halts. In the rest of this section, we use the notation K(x)
for KU (x) dropping the subscript U .
An important result of Levin [7] shows that up to an additive constant, for
all finite strings x,
− logm(x) ≥ K(x)
Combining this result with two simpler results (each is expressed up to an
additive constant), namely, − logm(x) ≤ C(x) and C(x) ≤ K(x), we conclude
that up to an additive constant,
− logm(x) = K(x)
Using prefix Kolmogorov complexity to express the amount of information in a
string about another, we conclude that up to an additive constant,
I(y : x) = I(x : y)
This is true because up to an additive constant, we have
K(x, y) = K(x) +K(y|x) = K(y) +K(x|y)
which implies that
K(x)−K(x|y) = K(y)−K(y|x)
or equivalently
I(y : x) = I(x : y)
We view this argument that up to an additive constant the amount of infor-
mation in y about x is equal to the amount of information in x about y as the
algorithmic information version of Bayes’ law. In fact, one can easily uses this
argument to derive Bayes’ law for Solomonoff’s a priori probability. We have
K(x)−K(x|y) = K(y)−K(y|x)
Replacing K(x) by − logm(x), we have, up to an additive constant
− logm(x) + logm(x|y) = − logm(y) + logm(y|x)
Applying basic rules for logarithms gives
m(x|y) =
m(x)
m(y)
.m(y|x)
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